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Abstract
In recent years, the military has made a concerted effort to use COTS
(commercial off-the-shelf) computing solutions instead of customized ap-
proaches. Thegeneralrationaleforthis is to reducecosts, shortentheinterval
of time-to-design to time-to-deployment,and increase standardization.
However, observation of the application of these principles during the
DSSG site visits, coupledwith backgroundresearch in the area, suggests that
some underlyingproblems with use of COTS products may actually result in
increased cost and decreased reliability — neither of which should be goals
of military procurement.
This essay describes, in an informal manner, why excessive emphasis on
the procurement and use of COTS computing solutions should be reconsid-
eredand reevaluated. The referencesstarting on page 11 can be consultedfor
additional background information, including some of the speciﬁc citations
presented in this paper.
1 Introduction
There is continuing pressure upon the military to use prepackaged components
when building solutions to technological needs. Prepackaged, or COTS — com-
mercial off-the-shelf, components tend to be available more quickly than special-
ized solutions can be designed and coded. Often, COTS solutions can be obtained
at less initial cost, and they may adhere to standards that enable them to better
interface to other standardized components.
For these same reasons, this pressure to use commercial off-the-shelf compo-
nents is no less acute in the area of hardware procurement. The computer industry
has been growing and changing at an incredible pace, coupled with an incredi-
ble growth in computer technology. The result has been swift obsolescence of
hardware/software solutions that were considered state-of-the-art only a few years
1before. As the military of the future (and present) is critically dependent on ad-
vanced technology, it is no surprise that DoD agencies seek to have the “latest and
greatest” technology at the best price.
There are, however, many hidden problems associated using COTS products,
and in particular, software. The most common problem is one of hidden costs.
Although COTS software may be cheaper to acquire in the short-term, in the long-
term, operations, maintenance, ﬁxing security ﬂaws, and other expenses may actu-
ally render the software more expensive than a custom-designed solution. COTS
software is primarily developed for the commercial marketplace — a much dif-
ferent environment. As such, it is often designed to have simplistic operation, a
very broad feature set, limited customization, and cursory testing. This is to en-
able the software to be used by a broad and unsophisticated user base, and allow a
compressed time-of-development to time-of-market sequence.
Contrast this with typical military needs. Military- oriented software usually
has a limited but well-deﬁned feature set, requires great reliability, is not accessi-
ble for frequent upgrade or patching, operates in security-critical environments, is
procured in small lots, and has heightened security concerns. Almost none of these
characteristics are shared with common, off-the-shelf, software packages available
in the commercial marketplace.
Historically, such objections have beendismissed asunimportant because COTS
software has not been used in mission-critical environments. However, over the
last few years, there has been a increasing trend to use COTS software as a base in
mission-critical applications. For instance,we have observed the use of Netscape
WWW browsers for mission planning packages and access to intelligence data, the
use of Windows 95 and Windows NT operating systems as host systems for C4I,
and Microsoft Excel for logistics. Because the COTS products have been used
without major incident in secondary roles, the military system designers and speci-
ﬁers are now calling for their use in more dangerous situations — without adequate
understanding of the risks.
2 A Fictional Scenario
Consider a contrived and somewhat melodramatic example to illustrate some of
the potential dangers.
It is the spring 1997. Thousands of college students from around the
United States, many of whom are from other countries, are look-
ing forward to the end of another semester. As one of the rites of
spring they are sending resumes to computer companies through-
out United States, seeking internships and permanent positions.
2Many of these are directed to the Microsoft Corporation, 1 and
many are hired.
Some of the students and new graduates are actually covert agents
of a foreign power. That country does not have a signiﬁcant in-
digenous information warfare capability. However, that has not
stopped them from sending scores of political and religious zealots
to study in the U.S., and then take jobs in sensitive positions.
Some of those agents are hired into positions writing code for the
Windows 98 operating system, to be released within another year.
Working secretly they insert subroutines into the portions of the
systems they’re working on. These pieces of code are harmless
when examined separately and have no visible effect on the opera-
tion of the software. Because of the lack of apparent effect of some
small pieces of code amidst hundreds of thousands of other lines
of undocumented code, no one questions their presence. Further-
more, because of the cursory testing involved in an effort to keep
Windows 98 from becoming Windows 99, the production code
is shipped in the summer of 1998 with most of these changes in
place.
In early 1999, political tensions begin to rise in the Middle East. The
United States responds by sending a carrier battle group and de-
ploying additional aircraft and personnel to bases in the region.
After carefully making plans, the intelligence service of one of the
belligerents instructs an agent to make a posting to an Internet bul-
letin board. The posting describes a serious security ﬂaw in the
Windows 98 operating system. One of the covert agents of the
country working at Microsoft is involved in creating a patch for
the security ﬂaw. The patch is widely distributed and is installed
on systems around the world, including many systems in use by
the U.S. military.
In early December many users of Windows 98 report unexplained
crashes or odd behavior. These reports are scattered and infre-
quent, and they are not treated as high priority in the customer
support service at Microsoft. Thus, the cause is still undetermined
on December 24.
1Microsoft has been chosen as the example in this scenario because of its dominant position in
the marketplace. This choice is not intended to imply that Microsoft is any worse than other vendors
of COTS products with respect to the problems illustrated by this story.
3At midnight on Christmas Eve (GMT) the security patch the previ-
ously hidden code activates. It interacts with the recent security
patch to unleash several new computer viruses and wormprograms
that propagate over any available network link, and that add them-
selves to executable code on any attached storage media. The code
also randomly scrambles ﬁle contents, deletes ﬁles, and disables
commands. The viruses exploit previously unknown ﬂaws in var-
ious versions of Windows and Windows NT, causing similar dis-
ruption and damage. Critical military systems based on Windows
malfunction or halt. Frantic operators attempt to reload the sys-
tems from backup media, only to have them fail as well. Later, it
is discovered that the only working backups are from before the
installation of the emergency patch: every backup since that time
has been corrupted with the changed code, and refuse to load, or
immediately activates the destructive code when started.
Meanwhile, the army of the belligerent country moves across neigh-
boring borders and initiates hostilities with the forces of several
nations friendly to the U.S. Allied forces are unable to respond
in a coordinated manner because signiﬁcant portions of the com-
mand and control infrastructure have been disabled. There are no
backup systems. Some of the systems appear to be unaffected but
their internal data has been severely corrupted; there are no inter-
nal checks to determine if data has been altered. In one notable
case, Navy cruise missiles destroy two schools and a retirement
home because the map database used to program them has been
altered to show the targets as enemy bunkers. In another case, Air
Force planes bomb a battalion of friendly forces with devastating
effects because their real-time targeting systems had confused rep-
resentations of friend and foe. U.S. forces are forced to withdraw
and turn off most of their computer systems. In addition to the hu-
miliation in the world media as a result of the civilian and friendly
force casualties, the U.S. also suffers severe political damage as a
result of its inability to assist our allies
Over the course of the next several weeks and months, investigation
is severely hampered by a lack of tools and expertise to analyze
the infected software, and by a lack of unaffected backup systems.
As time goes on, the military discovers that many of their very
large and important database systems, such as the TRANSCOM
databases, have been thoroughly corrupted and must be re-built
4from scratch to be accurate. Some data is lost forever. The loss in
time, manpower, and dollars is staggering. Personnel at Microsoft
disavow any responsibility and point to their shrink-wrap license.
Bill Gates offers to provide a discounted update to ﬁx the problems
if the government promises to drop its antitrust lawsuit against his
company.
Experts estimate that it will take a decade or more to recover from the
economic and political losses. The FBI is unable to ﬁnd evidence
sufﬁcient to identify the culprits working at Microsoft. Microsoft
employees discover that they have no audit trails or logs going
back far enough to identify who had access to the code in question,
so they are unable to assist. The cover agents continue in their
positions, waiting for the next opportunity.
This sounds like a piece of (bad) ﬁction – and it is. However, it is not entirely
removed from the realm of possibility. Some of the particular reasons why this
may be closer to reality than we might like are discussed in the next section.
3 Discussion of the Factors
3.1 Problems
The military is relying heavily upon commercial off-the-shelf computing solutions,
and the providers of the solutions are not developing them to military grade stan-
dards. The civilian population is driven to have the latest and greatest software, and
military is intent on having the cheapest software – and neither sector is sufﬁciently
concerned with quality, safety, or security.
In particular, one of the big concerns with COTSsoftware packages is the over-
all security of that software. COTS software is produced in commercial settings
where security (in a typical military sense) is neither applied nor practical. Thus
we have situations where front-line military units are using armaments procured
from companies that are required to do criminal background checks on employees,
conduct polygraph exams, and only hire only U.S. citizens. However, those same
armaments may be targeted and controlled by software packages available mail-
order in countries around the world and partially designed and written by foreign
nationals serving as student interns at software companies. Those packages are
then conﬁgured, assembled and integrated by personnel who have little training or
who perhaps spend some of their spare time breaking into computer systems as a
hobby. The incongruity is both astounding and frightening.
5Not too long ago there was a case in the news where Microsoft had sold a large
number of their systems to the government in the People’s Republic of China.
When the software was loaded and started by the Chinese, it displayed a mes-
sage on the screen that defamed the Chinese government. Upon investigation it
was found that the Chinese translation of the standard Microsoft screens had been
performed by a company in Taiwan. Unknown to the people in Redmond, unau-
thorized messages and code had been included in the Microsoft products destined
for Peking.
There have also been reports of viruses being distributed with commercial soft-
ware packages. The very ﬁrst macro virus for Word, the so-called ”concept” virus,
was distributed on a Microsoft-prepared CD-ROM of software for developers. The
distribution of the CD-ROM was widespread and resulted in a signiﬁcant global
incidence of computer viruses. Personnel at Microsoft were unaware that the virus
was present on their CD-ROM and were unable to identify the culprit who placed
it there.
Another major area of concern has to do with the robustness of the software.
Commercial software is usually built to sell at the lowest reasonable price to the
largest number ofpeople. Mostpeople use software in situations that arenot safety-
critical. As such, commercial software may fail in unexpected circumstances or
when operated out of expected bounds. Thus, in the usual case, commercial soft-
ware may be expected to fail badly but consumers discovering serious problems
are usually willing to wait to accept software patches or release of the next version.
This conﬂicts with the need for software to be usable in safety-critical and often
desperate circumstances such as might be experienced in a military setting.
There are literally thousands of examples in the literature of software that failed
to operate outside of relatively narrow constraints envisioned by the programmers.
In many of these cases the software may have even been custom-designed for the
particular application at hand. Developing software, especially software for safety
critical applications, is not a well understood art. Few COTS products are designed
to operate in safety critical environments and the majority of programmers devel-
oping them have had no exposure to important software engineering fundamental
concepts or safety engineering training.
Quality assurance is a third area where COTS software is lacking. Effective
software testing, including stress-testing, bounds testing, and limit testing, is time-
consuming and expensive process. In a commercial setting it is critical for busi-
nesses to produce and release software on very short cycle times: sometimes com-
panies release software revisions as frequently as every six months. Extensive
quality control and testing is incompatible with such schedules. Furthermore inten-
sive software testing requires trained personnel, expensive hardware and software,
and application of labor. All three of these lead to increase production costs and
6they are therefore unlikely to be commonly employed by most software vendors
developing for the common consumer marketplace.
Consider the standard business model is to maintain a competitive advantage
in the marketplace. To do this requires a constant stream of new features and prod-
ucts. Although these new features and products create new opportunities in the
marketplace, they also create new opportunities for software ﬂaws and errors. It
is also likely that these new features have not been tested or even designed for
the very large and complicated computing environment represented by the mil-
itary. Commercial development is generally focused on small issues and short
to medium-term research with high pay-off. There is little or no market advan-
tage (and possibly a disadvantage) in expending resources researching solutions to
problems not present in a signiﬁcant fraction of the consumer population, e.g. the
military.
One of the most common sources of software errors is lack of domain knowl-
edge. This occurs when the individuals who design and program the computer
system are insufﬁciently familiar with its intended application environment. Un-
less the requirements and speciﬁcations of the computing system to be designed
are exceedingly speciﬁc and detailed, subtle inconsistencies and errors may appear
in the ﬁnished product. There are many well-known examples of this phenomenon
in the software engineering literature. For instance, programmers who designed
the ﬂy-by-wire navigation controls for the F-18 inadvertently failed to account for
ﬂights that might cross the equator: the result was a system that would cause the
plane to ﬂip upside down whenever crossing the equator in either direction. (This
was found and corrected in the ﬂight simulator prior to actual deployment.) The
year 2000 problem can also be attributed to a lack of understanding about the even-
tual operational environment of the software under development —operation in the
year 2000. The rigorous design and testing procedures necessary to expose the ma-
jority of such problems are simply beyond the capability and cost model of most
COTS vendors.
In many settings where computer software is needed in a military environment
it is only necessary for the operator to make use of a limited number of commands.
For instance, in mission planning operations, there is no need for the operator to
have access to a general-purpose text editor and formatter, a Java compiler, a ﬁ-
nancial spreadsheet system, and a screen saver. However machines that support
most COTS software are general-purpose in nature, and may come equipped with
this broad variety of programs by default. If the systems are no so equipped, it
is a great temptation (and little effort) for the operators to obtain and install such
software. This encourages a proliferation of (potentially) unnecessary software,
perhaps leading to misuse of the systems, hazardous interaction of various subsys-
tems, and spread of computer viruses and other malware. Furthermore, as these
7many applications proliferate, and as the basic COTS platform increases in com-
plexity, the underlying hardware must be upgraded to support reasonable perfor-
mance of the base applications. It also lends itself to increased cost of operation as
these many additional software products require update, patches and maintenance
over time.
Functionality may also be sacriﬁced in such situations. Special functions that
would be of value to the war ﬁghter may well not be present in typical COTS
software. Thus, it is necessary either to develop alternatives (that may contain their
own bugs and limitations) from existing commands, re-train operators to use less
natural functions, and make do without the special functionality. This is especially
critical as a consideration when dealing with real-time software. Few standard
COTS software packages are appropriate for real-time applications where getting
guaranteed response is required.
Use of COTS software also eliminates the advantage of having customized and
sometimes classiﬁed software. By using a software base that is available to po-
tential enemies the underlying systems are made more vulnerable. This is because
potential enemies can obtain, study and develop attacks against that software well
in advance of its deployment. Customized software, although not necessarily clas-
siﬁed, is unlikely to be widely available and widely studied by all potential adver-
saries. This is an especially critical concern in the current and future geopolitical
arena where we may ﬁnd ourselves in opposition to almost any nation state.
For examples of this problem one only needs to look at any of the standard
security discussions on the Internet or in computer publications. Over the last
ﬁve years there has been a steady stream of reports of security problems and
bugs in commercial operating systems, including Sun’s Solaris, Hewlett-Packard’s
HP/UX, and Microsoft’s Windows NT. Coincident with the bug reports have been
repeated reports of computer system break-ins and attacks. The widespread avail-
ability of these systems has allowed individuals – many with malicious intent –
to study the systems extensively and then attack them. Experts in the ﬁeld have
no reason to believe that all of the potential attacks have been found or published.
Basing security-critical systems on platforms such as these may allow them to be
attacked or exploited in the event of military hostilities.
3.2 Costs
The underlying illusion of cost savings by using COTS software comes about
through a failure to perform appropriate cost-beneﬁt analysis. The initial, up-front
costs are almost always smaller when buying COTS products. However there are a
number of hidden costs that make long-term operation more expensive. For exam-
ple, to keep current with COTS products requires purchase, maintenance, and on-
8going support of more complex and complicated equipment than may be required
for the software at the heart of the system. The lifetime cost of this equipment and
software can be substantial.
Another hidden cost of using COTS products is that of user assistance and
training. Although it may seem that using standardized software would result in
savings by having uniform training materials and classes, if the standard software
chosen is complex, buggy and prone to computer viruses or other failures, it may
require more training and more active user support to effectively use the systems.
These small incremental costs are often not observed and not well quantiﬁed by
managers.
One last concern related to COTS occurs when the market is dominated by
only one or two major software vendors, such as Microsoft. In such a market
there is even less incentive for the vendor to spend extra resources on issues of
quality, testing, or customization that are necessary in safety critical systems. Why
bother? The consumer population has little effective choice, having been locked
into a de-facto standard set by the vendor. It is also the case that the vendor may
be less likely to accept requests for ﬁxes, customizations, or enhancements from
the military because they comprise such a small segment of the market. We have
heard that this has already occurred with regard to Microsoft.
It is not to be denied that using prepackaged solutions can result in signiﬁ-
cant cost savings. What is important to understand however, is that those solutions
must be evaluated for appropriateness and not solely for cost. Sacriﬁcing some
accuracy, safety, and precision for an up-front savings on cost may not be an ap-
propriate trade-off. There are applications and environments where COTSsoftware
is appropriate. It is also the case that COTS software and hardware solutions are
evolving quickly and may in the future present themselves as better alternatives.
However, at the current time, it appears foolish to place short-term cost savings at
a higher priority that overall quality and appropriateness for the task can.
3.3 Secondary effects
One consequence of the increased pressure to use COTSsolutions has been the loss
of both capability and infrastructure to produce specialized computing solutions
to military needs. In the 1970s and ’80s a number of ﬁrms developed custom
software for command and control applications, information security, navigation,
weapons design and targeting, and other military tasks. In the same companies or
closely allied to them were ﬁrms that produced specialized hardware platforms to
accommodate that software. This included embedded processors and equipment
hardened against EMF effects. However, over the last dozen years, as the military
has moved more towards a policy of buying COTS,the specialized companies have
9gone out of business. More to the point, the trained personnel who worked in
these businesses have moved on to other ﬁelds or have retired. As a consequence,
there has been almost no new generation of software engineers who have been
trained and practiced in the techniques and technology necessary to produce highly
reliable, hardened computing solutions to some future military needs.
4 Concluding Remarks
The situation described by the preceding can be addressed, but it must be done with
care. Furthermore, it must be done soon, before most systems are converted to a
COTS base that may be inappropriate.
To address this overall area set of problems will require careful study and a
multi-pronged approach. The ﬁrst, and perhaps most important part in any such
effort will be to construct a realistic cost model for the procurement, installation,
upgrade, maintenance, and use of COTS software. This model also needs to be
coupled with a detailed and realistic risk assessment of the use of various products
in their target environments. It is inappropriate to only considered the initial ac-
quisition costs for a software and hardware combination without considering all of
the long-term implications and their associated risks. To do so is to run the risk
of incurring a much greater cost in later years, and possibly to ﬁnd the application
committed to a platform that is increasingly risky to use.
A second activity would be to identify areas of technology necessary to sup-
port specialized computing solutions. Some of those areas will be well supported
in the current marketplace. For instance, there are some commercial capabilities
for real-time design for factory automation, ﬂight control, and medical systems.
However, capabilities to produce a wider variety of systems that also include sup-
port for multi-level security, safety, and environmental hardening are currently in
short supply (or nonexistent). It is unlikely that any signiﬁcant commercial mar-
kets will develop for these technologies in the near-term. It is also unlikely that
talented scientists and engineers will be drawn to work in these areas when they
are also presented with attractive opportunities to work on problems supported by
the marketplace. Therefore, it will be necessary to design appropriate incentives to
encourage training and retention of at least a core competency in these areas, if for
no other reason than to perform maintenance on existing systems.
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